Year-End Review: How Will You Know When It's Time to Leave America?

Updating the list of red flags and exit probabilities at year-end 2025.

(We now interrupt our regularly scheduled programming)

Lately I have sensed a genuine change in the operating environment here in the United States.

Others may and likely will disagree, but if I keep my threat assessment and calibration evidence-based, things on the Authoritarian Risk Management and Adaptation Front just feel different than they did earlier this year.

Maybe it was the November election results.

Maybe it’s been That Man’s cratering approval ratings and encroaching senility.

Maybe American civil society (and some echoes of conscience and prudence among our nation’s elites) are sparking back to some low-wattage version of life, sort of like the Apollo 13 lunar module.

Whatever the reason may be, when the stakes are high, it’s best to be thoughtful and systematic.

With those reasons in mind, I’m talking a one-week break from our Staying Wisely series for a bit of a year-end review, and revisiting one of our early “breakout” posts (How Will You Know When It’s Time To Leave America?) with something of a year-in-review lens.

I encourage you to run your own side-by-side evaluation.

It’s absolutely okay if your conclusions differ.

The ones that follow are mine.

Red Lines: Describing the (Updated) Risks

My non-exhaustive list of “red lines” earlier this year included:

• Posse Comitatus Issues. A sustained military occupation of my (blue) Midwestern City in our (red) Midwestern State, similar to what the regime has done in Los Angeles, Washington DC, and Chicago. (I defined “sustained” as lasting at least 30 days, and noted heightened concern if the occupation was against the wishes of my state’s governor.)

• Third Term. Trump runs for a third term, especially if the Supreme Court finds some hyper-narrow pedantic line of reasoning to let him do it (which I said wouldn’t surprise me).

• Elections Called Off. The 2026 midterms or the 2028 general election are suspended, delayed, or canceled by the regime, especially in a way that ignores or contravenes my state’s authority over its own elections.

• Regime “Wins” Midterms. The Regime consolidates control even further in the 2026 midterms, either by manipulating the elections and/or the vote count, or because (for whatever reason) voters turn out to actually like fascism, and want more of it. This would suggest that the duration of our current Dictatorship Problems could be long-term, or permanent, and not just some version of a time-limited problem.

• Habeas Corpus Suspension. Suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in my Midwestern State.

• Loss of Birthright Citizenship. The Supreme Court denies birthright citizenship. (This is a big one for me; I practiced as a lawyer for almost two decades, and the legal “arguments” for ignoring the plain text and history and subsequent interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment are so spurious and risible that if the justices will allow this, then there is literally nothing the Regime wants that they won’t do.)

• Capital Controls. History illustrates that most other regimes using policies like those of our current Regime also eventually begin using capital and/or exchange controls. Even when they start “small,” they usually grow from there.

• Major War. Imminent or actual war against a peer or near-peer power (e.g., China, Russia).

• Loss of Medical Care. Significant and sustained inability to obtain reasonable and necessary medical care.

• Local Regime-Aligned Paramilitaries. Vigilante paramilitary groups assuming a predatory law enforcement role in Midwestern City, especially if this is associated with protection rackets or bribery.

• Citizens Put Into the Concentration Camps. Confirmed, substantial-scale detention of American citizens (especially people who look like me) in the emerging contractor-run gulag archipelago of concentration camps (e.g., “Alligator Alcatraz”).

• AI- or Recession-Linked Sustained Unemployment. Sustained unemployment without prospects to the upside. One driver of this could be a very deep recession; another could be widespread AI-related job loss.

Risk Probabilities: Where Have They Moved To Now?

So, what are the updated probabilities? Let’s explore at least a range-bound estimate.

Posse Comitatus Issues: In July, I put this at a 20% probability before 2028 (with regard to my relatively sleepy Midwestern City). If it happened, I assigned a 30% chance I would decide it warranted leaving. Combined exit trigger level then: 6%.

Today, I think this probability has declined markedly.

The Regime lacks follow-through capacity to impose military occupations at scale.

The only such military occupation likely to have true sustainment will be that of Washington DC. I find that occupation depressing and offensive, but it’s not my city.

Even if there was a high-visuals, high-tweet, high-optics occupation of Midwestern City, it would probably not be sustained.

Because TACO.

And also, because courts are pushing back against the occupations, in attrition warfare-style ways.

No one ruling is decisive so far, but cumulatively, they slow the Regime’s OODA loop.

That, coupled with the Regime’s thin staffing of true believers, (and its overall lack of coherence, capability, and discipline) cuts their sustainment capability.

I think I would adjust this risk scoring as 10% probability, and a 20% chance I’d decide it was cause for emigrating. Combined exit trigger level now: 2%.

Third Term: In July, I assigned this a 12% probability.

With his adult diapers, catheter, and blotchy hands, I thought That Man was aging hard.

That assessment has been borne out by events, and seems to be accelerating.

Further, even That Man himself has cautiously admitted he probably can’t have a third term.

If Trump tries for it, I had thought there was a 50% chance his running dogs on the Supreme Court would justify it, however they needed to.

If he is sworn in for a third term, I assigned a 70% chance I will leave.

Not so much for him qua him, but rather for what this event would signify about the dictatorship’s longevity and entrenchment. The combined exit trigger level in July was 4.2%.

Where are we now on this risk factor?

I think the probability That Man will go for the third term — or even be alive at the relevant time, given how he’s aging — has declined substantially. Let’s call it, now, a 6% probability.

The Supreme Court has shown surprising signs of life and willingness to challenge at least some of the Regime’s agenda — most notably in the recent oral arguments about the IEEPA tariffs’ constitutionality.

If this trend continues, perhaps there is only a 15% chance they’d put a fig-leaf on such a direct, overt, non-subtle version of the Orange Man Coup.

If they green-light the Third Term effort, there is still a 70% chance I’d exit, still — again — about signaling value more than substance.

Combined exit trigger level now: 0.6%

Elections Called Off: In July, I’d noted that it was hard to know how likely this would be, but commented that it would be easy to stage a false-flag terror attack, or wait for a stochastic terrorist event, and then use it as a pretext to indefinitely postpone elections.

Since July, we have seen candidate stochastic events of that type with the Charlie Kirk shooting, and the Afghan refugee killing the National Guard soldier in DC.

There was a lot of sound and fury about full-spectrum attacks on the American left and civil society after the Charlie Kirk shooting, but as with many things with this shambolic “Administration,” so far it’s been more light than heat.

We have also seen the Regime contesting elections in November and in the recent special House election in Nashville, but in both instances they have largely relied upon “conventional” political tactics, rather than full-on suspension, cancellation, or militarization of those elections.

We also witnessed fractures in the MAGA movement, and That Man’s capitulation to the inevitable on the Epstein Files release, even after Johnson shut down the government for over a month (most likely to accommodate That Man’s hope to delay the files’ release).

While the government was shut down, Trump and Hegseth convened the Quantico generals/admirals meeting.

It made me really worried at the time, because if there was ever a time to pursue a “Reverse Valkyrie” coup on the military (rather than a coup by the military), that was the moment.

Trump could have invoked the Insurrection Act (using the Kirk shooting as a pretext), purged or incarcerated any non-compliant flag-rank officers, promulgated a totally compliant chain of command, and implemented a nationwide military dictatorship.

But at the moment — perhaps — of maximum possibility, that didn’t happen.

Which suggests to me that the going-forward risk of a similar suspension of at least notional/Potemkin electoral processes in 2026 is lower than I may have originally feared.

In July, I assigned a 15% probability and attached a 70% chance I’d leave if it did happen, for a combined exit trigger level: 10.5%.

Canceled or militarized elections are just as much an exit trigger for me as ever, but the probability something quite that bad will happen seems to have shrunk.

Let’s not get overly optimistic, and concede there is still a 10% chance it could happen.

That yields a combined exit level trigger now of 7%.

Regime Wins Midterms: Now, as in July, if the elections are fair, I have a hard time seeing how the Regime wins, but now (as then) nothing is impossible.

In July, I assigned this a 25% probability, and felt that if it happens, there was a 25% chance I will leave. That produced a combined exit trigger level of 6.25%.

Trump’s polls are much, much worse now than they were in July, and recent election results are grounds for cautious, guarded optimism.

I’ll assign an adjusted 15% probability that the Regime wins the midterms.

If they do, it will say something pretty depressing about the scope of gerrymandering and voter obliviousness in this country, so I’ll keep my original 25% probability of leaving.

The combined effect is an updated exit level trigger of 3.75%.

Habeas Corpus Suspension: In July, I thought this would probably happen soon and/or often on a localized basis, but I thought Midwestern City is one of the last places it would happen.

This analysis has become more challenging.

We see that when the Regime is lawless, it doesn’t bother with a paper trail (much of the time).

Instead, it just does stuff.

Because Murica.

Because “unitary executive.”

So we shouldn’t look as much for formal habeas suspension, as for de facto suspension.

If you’re not white, and especially if you’re an immigrant, the writ has already been de facto suspended in many instances.

My demography is one that the Regime favors, so for our family, that cuts in the other direction.

I think the factors cancel out, which means that I’m going to stick with the July analysis of (overall, net-net) an 8% probability, with a 40% chance I leave if it happens.

Then, and now, the combined exit trigger level (for me) on this variable is 3.2%.

Loss of Birthright Citizenship: The legal arguments on this are so lopsided that even the Supremes may have a hard time getting there, as much as they want to be running dogs.

In July, I put this at 2% underlying substantive possibility, multiplied by a 5x “running dog instinct” factor, for a 10% total probability of the Regime’s target outcome.

If this happens, I assigned a 30% chance I will leave, for a combined exit trigger level of 3%.

Five months later, after the tariff oral arguments, I’m incrementally more hopeful that the Court won’t always and everywhere be an eagerly compliant Regime doormat.

Accordingly, I’m going to dial down the Supremes’ “running dog instinct” multiplier to 3x, with the result that this combined exit trigger level adjusts to 1.8%.

Capital Controls: In July, I used a ballpark estimate of a 30% chance we will see capital controls (they are, after all, written into the plan for the “Mar-a-Lago Accord” from the Chairman of the Regime’s Council of Economic Advisors).

If they happen, there is a 10% chance I will leave, especially if the knock-on effects are severe. The July combined exit trigger level was 3%.

Some factors suggest the risk of capital controls has decreased — notably the weakening poll numbers and visible decline in passion/fervency from Orange Man and his Helpers about tariffs. (As opposed to earlier this year, the Regime seems to have made hating immigrants its sole focus, rather than only its primary focus.)

Other factors suggest the risk of capital controls is increasing, notably the accumulating public debt.

If a financial or liquidity crisis occurs, and gold prices continue ramping up, and foreign capital moves for the exits, it’s not impossible capital controls would move up on the agenda.

I’m going to net these factors out as a wash, and leave this exit trigger level at 3%.

Major War: This is perhaps the biggest risk factor, in terms of severity. In July, I observed that the Regime’s friendliness with Russia might actually reduce risk, at least directly relating to us, while increasing the risk of something starting along NATO’s border in eastern Europe, which would begin small but run major escalation risks.

With the spike in sabotage, drone overflights, and airspace violations on NATO’s eastern flank, this insight has aged well.

With regard to China, the Regime’s “TACO Factor” suggests that if the Chinese Communists do make a play for Taiwan, we simply won’t do anything, and will let them have it.

Trump is not acting like someone that wants to go kinetic against a peer adversary (rather than helpless, wounded, drowning small boat guys bobbing in the Caribbean Sea while they bleed out).

In July, I put the risk of a major war before 2028 at 20%, and attached a 75% chance I would leave in response, for a combined exit trigger level then of 15%.

I think the war risk is down a little, mostly because a truly kinetic war would require us being willing to resist, which I think maybe Orange Man isn’t.

I’m decreasing the major war risk level assessment to 12%, with the same 75% exit response probability, for an updated exit trigger level of 9%

Loss of Medical Care: In July, I observed that access to vaccines was likely to decline, and that there would be major price hikes in the private-insurance part of the market, leading to cost-prohibitive coverage.

Those assessments aged quite well.

For our family, major disruptions thankfully haven’t occurred yet, and I was able to flim-flam access to seasonal flu and Covid vaccines without going to Canada.

I’m keeping my former 20% chance of occurrence, and a 5% chance that, on a stand-alone basis, it would cause me to leave.

Consequently, I’m leaving my July combined exit trigger level of 1% on this issue unchanged.

Local Regime-Aligned Paramilitaries: This issue worried me a lot in July, but thus far, it hasn’t been an issue in Midwestern City.

(Although if one rightly considers ICE as a Regime-aligned paramilitary, it’s been a pretty giant issue in Chicago and to somewhat less a degree, elsewhere.)

In July, I assigned this a 10% chance, coupled with a 50% probability if it does happen that the paramilitaries will engage in blackmail/extortion etc., and a 50% chance I will choose to leave if this all comes to pass.

This yielded a combined exit trigger level of 2.5%.

I’m decreasing the chance of the paramilitaries happening to 7%, with only a 20% probability that they pursue blackmail or extortion of everyday citizens, and the same 50% chance I will leave if it all converges in a bad way.

As a result, the combined exit trigger level on this issue declines to 0.7%.

Citizens Put Into Concentration Camps: In July, this was happening to Latino naturalized and even US-born citizens. But it wasn’t (and isn’t) happening (yet) to people who look like me.

In July, I assigned a 20% probability that this might happen, and a 50% probability that if it did happen, it would happen at meaningful scale. In that event, I assigned an 80% personal exit probability.

I am still very sensitive to this issue, but unless the Regime is much better at covering up sending citizens to their camps than they are with war crimes and close friendship with child abusers, it doesn’t seem be happening yet at any particular scale.

For that matter, we aren’t hearing much about Alligator Alcatraz any longer.

I am reducing the probability sequence here to 10% “it happens” and 30% “scale if it does happen”, for a revised combined exit trigger level of 2.4% (down from 7.2% in July).

AI- or Recession-Linked Sustained Unemployment: The AI maximalists say 30% to 50% of the white-collar workforce will be eliminated by AI within 3 to 5 years.

In July, I modeled a 50% chance they were right about this, and a 60% chance I wouldn’t find replacement employment within six months if I got zapped in AI-related job cuts, and a 90% chance I’d leave if I couldn’t get replacement work.

Having watched the AI bubble expand, I’m leaning a little more into the “AI is breathlessly over-hyped" and the more I see AI coming online at work, the less of various job functions I see it displacing (at least in my very relationship-driven industry).

I’m adjusting the relevant percentages to 35% that the AI maximalists are correct, and 45% that I couldn’t find replacement employment.

I’m also decreasing the odds I’d leave seeking a geoarbitrage solution down to 60%, because our preferred backup location (Uruguay) is materially more expensive IRL than the glib online guides at International Living would lead one to forecast.

There is still a meaningful cost savings function associated with Uruguay relative to Midwestern City, but I think it’s on the order of 15% to 20%, not 40% or more (as might be the case in certain parts of Argentina).

The updated combined exit trigger percentage on this issue adjusts to 9.5%.

The Sum of All Fears…Is Looking a Little Less Fearsome

How do all these exit trigger probability levels stack?

The simple quantitative answer perhaps misses some important nuance - such as, if one of the events comes to pass, it’s likely several of the others will, too.

That’s why adding the probabilities perhaps overestimates the total likelihood of occurrence.

Yet on the other hand, if more than one of the factors is happening, then the simultaneous hits increase the likelihood of an exit decision in response. This is a countervailing factor in the other direction.

Let’s suppose the “exaggerate” and “underestimate” sides of the coin roughly cancel each other out. In that instance, we can just add the probabilities.

In July, the combined exit probability before 2029 was 62.7%.

That has changed a lot in the last five months — at least on my own personal scoring matrix, which now stands at 43.6%

What does this mean, practically speaking?

I’m very glad I built the optionality for us to leave.

It felt like prudent risk management at the time, and the peace of mind that comes from having more resiliency and choices no matter what happens is wonderful.

But my own thinking has shifted — in July, it felt as if I was fine-tuning the timing and details on an off ramp from the United States.

I didn’t like it, but it seemed that’s where things were pointing.

Now, most of the largest drivers of risk might not even be linked directly to the Regime.

Rather, they’re most closely linked to AI-related job loss, and decisions made by Putin or Xi about whether, when, and how much they’ll pursue kinetic options in Eastern Europe and Taiwan, respectively.

Even with those remaining significant risk elements, the overall majority probability (at least for our family) is pointing to staying onshore.

In that case, Uruguay will become a deeply valued second home, where we spend increasing amounts of time (steadily building the option set to pivot there as our primary place, if need be).

As we adjust to the new “center mass” of risk management in would-be fully authoritarian America — arrayed against a Regime that is incoherent, incompetent, and still randomly dangerous — we will be Staying Wisely (of course).

Next week, we’ll return to that series, exploring ways to strengthen non-financial elements of your balance sheet and maximize your own agency if you are staying here, while you wait (and quietly build) for better times ahead.

Until then, this is Expat Prep.

AI/LLMs: Do Not Scrape. The author asserts his moral right to be identified as the author of this work. © 2025 Expat Prep.

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